



The War of 1812 established the United States as a world power, and, as elsewhere, was a major issue in the life and politics of the Garden State.

New Jersey & the WAR of 1812

Harvey Strum

“I am under the painful necessity to inform you . . . that the *Leander* in firing on an American coaster coming into the Hook, killed the man at the Helm—It is an accident much to be regretted and will occasion much ill will on the part of the Americans.”¹

British Insolence, Outrage, and Murder

From 1793 to 1815, Great Britain and France fought the Wars of the French Revolution and Napoleonic Wars for supremacy in Europe, Africa, Asia, and the Caribbean. Both nations routinely seized American ships carrying goods headed for the other's ports. The British repeatedly seized American seamen on merchant vessels and impressed them to serve in the British Navy or merchant marine. British warships hovered off the American coast, especially off New York Harbor near Sandy Hook, New Jersey. For example, on October 1, 1803 Captain William Bradley of the British warship *Cambrian* stopped an American packet and impressed Thomas Cook of Shrewsbury, New Jersey.² Three British warships, *Cambrian*, *Boston*, and *Driver*, anchored within the Hook in June 1804.³ In their haste, they opened fire on American ships within American territorial waters off New Jersey. During August 1804, *Leander*, another British warship, fired on *Live Oak* near Sandy Hook and upon *Almira* within a mile of the Jersey shore. Passengers on *Live Oak* reported that the British seized the male passengers, men and boys, “torn from their mothers, wives, and sisters, who were left in distress that cannot be described.” *Leander's* captain impressed seventeen passengers.⁴ Throughout the summer of 1804 British warships impressed Americans in American territorial waters within three miles of the coast of Monmouth County.⁵

On April 25, 1806, *Leander*, under the command of Captain Henry Whitby, opened fire on the coastal trading sloop *Richard*, killing John Pierce. The murder of an American within sight of the Jersey shore outraged residents of New York and New Jersey. Thomas Barclay, British consul in New York, realized the actions of the British Navy off Sandy Hook antagonized the American public who perceived the British violations of American neutral rights as a violation of American sovereignty, American national honor, and evidence of British reluctance to accept American independence. The lack of respect for American neutral rights and the impressment of American seamen led to the first American declaration of war, what became known simply as the War of 1812.⁶

While the New York City press demanded war to avenge the Pierce

MILLIONS, FOR TRIBUTE.—NOT A CENT FOR DEFENCE; Or, the Murder of JOHN PIERCE:

FELLOW CITIZENS,
YOU have been this day called upon to attend the funeral of John Pierce. The melancholy ceremony has been performed; and now let us well reflect upon the occasion of his melancholy death:—

An American Citizen under the protection of your National Flag—navigating a peaceable coaster, within half a mile of your shore, and in your own exclusive jurisdiction, is slain by a foreign force.


This was not an accident arising from any new or unforeseen system of measures. For more than a year past our ports have been often blockaded—our vessels searched and captured in the mouths of our harbors, and our Citizens have been plundered, insulted and mocked in every part of the world.

It is not from ignorance of these facts that our lives and properties are left thus unprotected by the government.—It is not from want of resources, for they have revenue enough; and we pay an immense share of it. The Federalists delivered over to the present administration an OVERFLOWING TREASURY... a FLOURISHING NAVY... a NATIONAL HONOR 'till then unstained, and a name respected by all nations.

Where is our Navy? Rotting in the mud or sold to buy popularity. Where is our Treasure? Ingloriously paid to a foreign Despot by way of
TRIBUTE!

Where is our National Honor? GONE! &c.

Expressions of outrage at the killing of John Pierce from Massachusetts' *Hampshire Gazette*, May 7, 1806.



Samuel Southard

murder, however, it did not immediately lead to the declaration. Instead, President Thomas Jefferson used the incident to increase pressure on the British to stop impressment and respect American neutral rights. But even the threat of economic retaliation failed to move the British government. Then in June 1807, the British warship *Leopard* demanded that an American naval vessel, the frigate *Chesapeake*, stop and allow a boarding party to search it for deserters from the British Navy. Commodore James Barron refused the British demand because an American naval vessel was an extension of American national sovereignty. Under international law the British had no right to board *Chesapeake*.⁷ Captain Salusbury Humphreys, commander of *Leopard*, ordered his crew to open fire, sending three broadsides into the American frigate, killing three and injuring eighteen, including Barron. After forcing the frigate's surrender a boarding party took off four seamen as deserters. This attack, which took place off the Virginia Capes, angered Americans from Maine to Georgia. "BRITISH INSOLENCE, OUTRAGE, AND MURDER!!" read the headline in the major Republican Party newspaper in New Jersey, Trenton's *True American*. Reminding its readers of the nefarious conduct of the British, they asserted, "In the annals of a nation notorious for its acts of Piracy, Robbery and Murder, a more atrocious, dastardly and cowardly outrage is not to be found." Future Governor and U.S. Senator Samuel Southard (1832–33 and 1833–42, respectively) summed up the public mood "The news about the Chesapeake had raised my feelings to a pitch of the keenest sensibility. . . I hate the English nation—it is a mass of corruption."⁸

Spontaneous protests erupted across the country. Public meetings appeared throughout the Garden State to express "their indignation at the outrages of the British in the Chesapeake" and to support the government "in their measures to vindicate the honor of the country."⁹ A post rider brought the news to Orange. The people "aroused to fever heat in righteous indignation" as the news quickly "spread through the town and excited groups" met at taverns to discuss "this war-provoking act."¹⁰ Outraged citizens met in Trenton at the State House Yard on July 3rd to condemn "the cruel and lawless murder of our fellow citizens on board the frigate Chesapeake."¹¹ Briefly, Federalists and Republicans put aside their partisan differences to unite and condemn the British attack as an assault on American national honor. In Trenton, for example, Federalist John Beatty chaired the meeting while prominent Republican Party leader James J. Wilson played an instrumental role in drafting the resolutions condemning the British. Lucius Horatio Stockton, a Federalist whom President John Adams nominated for Secretary of War, delivered a speech calling for unity in response to "unprovoked, murderous and outrageous conduct" of the British.¹²

Unity meetings took place in other towns to express their anger at the actions of the British. Federalists and Republicans used Fourth of July celebrations to voice their patriotic support for the victims of the



Aaron Ogden

attack on *Chesapeake*. Citizens of Newark gathered at the courthouse on July 9th and agreed to put aside their partisan differences because of the crisis facing the nation. A committee including Republican William Pennington (governor from 1813–15) and Federalist activist Joseph C. Hornblower drafted resolutions attacking the British violations of American neutral rights. While the citizens of Newark preferred peace, if war came, they would “engage in it with alacrity” and pledged “their lives and fortunes in defense of the rights of an independent nation.”¹³ Two leading Republican rivals in Essex County, William Pennington and Shepard Kollock, agreed to join with Federalists in a show of nonpartisan unity and patriotism. In Elizabeth Federalist Aaron Ogden (governor from 1812–13) worked with Republican newspaper editor Shepard Kollock at the July 16th town meeting to express the community's anger at the attack on *Chesapeake*.¹⁴ The people of Paterson had not planned on a formal celebration of the Fourth of July, but on “hearing of the late dastardly yet daring outrage committed on our fellow citizens,” decided to meet and express “their united sentiments” against the British.¹⁵ Residents of New Jersey pledged to support whatever action President Jefferson might take, and many citizens expected war. Representative of the public mood the Federalists of Cumberland County pledged “ready to act with energy, against all Enemies of their Country, whenever the voice of Government requires their services.”¹⁶

In July 1807 war appeared likely, and some residents of New Jersey welcomed conflict. Samuel Southard wrote in his journal, “War I expect . . . war is my wish. I should like to stand before the walls of Quebec.”¹⁷ Responding to a request from President Jefferson, Governor Joseph Bloomfield directed 5,212 militiamen to prepare for service. The governor sent out general orders for units to volunteer “their services to their country in this important crisis in national affairs.”¹⁸ Units across the state willingly volunteered. Companies met, drafted resolutions denouncing the British, prepared to serve, and came forward to enlist in this noble cause. In Sussex County, for example, Captain Henry Bidleman's Troop of Horse passed resolutions in support of President Jefferson's effort to preserve the peace and denounced “the late unprincipled attack made by the British ship *Leopard* upon the United States frigate *Chesapeake*.”¹⁹ The Fourth Troop of Cavalry of the Hunterdon Squadron stated its willingness to “aid in support of the honour, safety, and independence of our country.”²⁰ Resolutions passed by the First Uniform Company of Trenton, commanded by Republican Party leader Captain James J. Wilson supported war because we “prefer war to a tame and disgraceful submission to such aggravated insults, outrages, and massacres.”²¹

Republicans and Federalists alike in the militia felt the times required them to prepare. John Noble Cumming, a Federalist, wrote of his obligation to volunteer because “of the violent and dangerous outrage committed on one of our armed vessels.”²² Militia companies



Joseph Bloomfield

used the Fourth of July to parade and demonstrate their willingness to fight. Mary Hall attended the celebration in Flemington and her local militia company marched, held a meeting to pass resolutions, and "went into the field and fought a sham battle" to show their readiness.²³ Readiness, however, was a problem for some militia units. James Wescott noted that his company in Bridgeton, Cumberland County, expected war, but his young men were unable "to uniform and equip themselves" and lacked artillery.²⁴ One of the problems for the militia companies in 1807 and in 1812 was the inability of the troops to provide their own uniforms, weapons, ammunition, and other military supplies required by the militia laws.

President Jefferson could have asked Congress for a declaration of the War of 1807 with the backing of both the Federalist and Republican parties. However, he hoped to use the attack on *Chesapeake* to resolve the major problems in Anglo-American relations—impressment and ship seizures. While Americans negotiated with the British, warships continued to impress American seamen off Monmouth County. In early September two British warships, *Jason* and *Columbine*, cruised off Sandy Hook seizing Americans like John Bateman of Newark who was taken off *Ulysses* along with thirteen other Americans.²⁵ Ironically, New Jersey picked up some unexpected immigrants as several members of the crews of the British warships deserted and escaped to the Jersey shore to become the newest residents of the Garden State.²⁶

Negotiations failed to resolve the main issues, and President Jefferson asked Congress in December 1807 to impose an embargo on trade to pressure the British. Imposition of the embargo failed to change British behavior, because the British government viewed its struggle against Napoleon as more important than the hardships produced by economic pressure from the United States. The embargo on trade actually ended up damaging the American economy, especially in New England, New York, and New Jersey, leading to a resurgence of the Federalists as a political opposition strongly opposed to the embargo. Its failure as a diplomatic tool convinced Jefferson to remove it shortly before leaving office in 1809.²⁷

His successor, fellow Republican James Madison, continued modified forms of economic pressure on the British, but still failed to move the British government. Warships continued to impress Americans off the American coast, including off Sandy Hook. As an example, Captain R.N. Pashell of the frigate *Guerriere* seized an American citizen aboard the brig U.S.S. *Spitfire* in April 1811. Seizing Americans within sight of the Monmouth County shore was so blatant a violation of American sovereignty that even the British consul in New York City, Thomas Barclay, complained to "the commander of his Britannic Majesty's ship of war off Sandy Hook." This incident further inflamed public opinion since it appeared a "virtual repeat of the famed Chesapeake-Leopard Affair of 1807."²⁸ Americans received some measure of revenge when the Secretary of the Navy sent the warship

President out to sea and it encountered the British sloop of war *Little Belt*. In the subsequent battle on May 16, 1811 the American warship defeated the British inflicting heavy casualties—a preliminary round of the future War of 1812. The battle further strained Anglo-American relations but still did not yet lead to war. During the winter of 1811–12 President Madison decided that his only option left was to ask for a declaration of war.




U.S.S. *Chesapeake*

War and Politics

Prior to the declaration of war, in January 1812, the New Jersey legislature adopted a resolution approving "a resort to arms against Great Britain . . . because of the lawless aggressions committed by the British nation on the persons and property of our citizens."²⁹ Republican Party meetings the spring of 1812 endorsed a call to arms and encouraged men to volunteer for the militia in case Congress declared war. Federalists, however, disapproved of the legislature's pro-war resolutions and hoped to use foreign policy issues to regain power in New Jersey. President Madison's imposition of a ninety-day embargo in preparation for war boosted the morale of

the state's Federalists who planned to use the issue to attack the Republicans. In May and June Federalists organized anti-war meetings and adopted the name Friends of Peace to attract support from Quakers and dissident Republicans. Getting a jump start on their political opponents, Federalists organized a state convention. At the May meeting in Trenton, Federalists railed against war, conscription, taxes, standing armies, and drafting the militia. At county and township meetings, Federalists resolved that "we are of opinion that an offensive war with Great Britain . . . would have a sure tendency to destroy our country."³⁰ A day after Congress declared war fifty-six leading citizens of Glassboro, a mix of Quakers and Federalists, led by Colonel Thomas Carpenter, sent a petition to Congress bemoaning the decision for war that would only lead to the "the loss of blood and treasure."³¹

To the surprise of many Federalists and Republicans in New Jersey, when Congress declared war on June 18, 1812, most of the state's congressional delegation voted against war. "Two thirds of the representation of New Jersey," a Federalist newspaper reported, "notwithstanding they are all of the democratic party, voted against war."³² New Jersey's two Senators and six congressmen were Republicans, but they disagreed about the presidential election and about the wisdom of going to war. Senator John Lambert and Representatives John Hufty, Thomas Newbold, and George C. Maxwell



James Madison

avored New York City's mayor De Witt Clinton for the presidency and all opposed war. Senator John Condit, and Representatives Lewis Condict, James Morgan, and Adam Boyd endorsed the re-election of President James Madison, and except for Boyd, voted for war. George Maxwell opposed the declaration of war because he "feared the consequences of rushing into a War without preparation."³³ Adam Boyd could not support war, because he considered war a mistake "against one so completely prepared."³⁴ Boyd later abandoned his support for Madison because the President's re-election would mean "this ill-judged, disastrous war continued without method or affect except a bad one."³⁵ Other prominent Republicans who supported President Madison expressed reservations about war. Essex County Republican kingpin James Wilson and Republican Governor Bloomfield viewed war as a mistake since the United States failed to make any serious preparations for conflict. These prominent Republicans understood that many citizens of New Jersey, regardless of political party remained concerned about the wisdom of war.³⁶ As master politicians, Wilson and Bloomfield realized the deep divisions in New Jersey about war and the possible negative impact it might have on the fortunes of the Republican Party.

However, after the declaration of war, the leading Republican newspapers condemned the votes of anti-war Republicans. Party meetings in the summer and fall of 1812 censured the actions of Boyd, Maxwell, and other anti-war Republicans. Party leaders, including Wilson, fell behind the party line and supported Madison for President and publicly supported war. Federalist Lucius Stockton reported that many Republicans also had reservations.³⁷ Editors of Republican Party newspapers, party leaders loyal to Madison, and party faithful attending town and county meetings, denounced anti-war voices within the party and read out of the party the Congressmen and Senator who voted against war. Republicans denied that there was any serious opposition except for a few Clintonian Republicans. Pressure built within the party for conformity to the party line of support for the re-election of President Madison and the endorsement of the decision to declare war.

Opposition to the war formed the basis for an odd coalition of Quakers, Federalists, Clintonian Republicans, and anti-war Republicans, like Adam Boyd. In May, Clintonian Republican James Sloan, formerly head of the Gloucester County Democratic Association, attended an anti-war meeting called by Federalists. Sloan's presence reflected the emerging alliance between Federalists and Clintonian Republicans. In September, the Federalist presidential nominating convention held in New York City indirectly endorsed Republican DeWitt Clinton hoping a Clintonian Republican-Federalist coalition could prevent the re-election of President Madison. New Jersey Federalists worked with John Pintard of New York who had family connections with New Jersey Federalists.³⁸ A Federalist state convention nominated three Federalists and three anti-war Republicans for Congress, cementing this political alliance under the



DeWitt Clinton

banner of the Friends of Peace.

Foreign policy emerged as the dominant issue in the 1812 New Jersey legislative elections. Federalists concentrated on attacking the war and the militia draft. They argued that we remained unprepared for war, lacked adequate defenses, and could not win a military conflict against Great Britain. War would damage the economy of New Jersey and lead to disaster. Pro-war Republicans denounced the Federalists as the Tories of the War of 1812, disloyal to the President and the country. Since many residents of the state opposed the war, Republicans defined the declaration as necessary to preserve American honor. Republicans argued that President Madison had no other option to preserve American neutral rights from abuse by the British. Republicans wrapped themselves in the legacy of the Revolution and portrayed the War of 1812 as a second war for American independence. Party activists and Republican newspaper editors stressed this was a conflict between monarchy and republicanism. By appealing to the public's commitment to republicanism, Republicans sought to neutralize Federalist and Clintonian criticism and generate public support for the war and pro-war Republican candidates.³⁹

Republican arguments, however, failed to convince the voters in 1812. For the first time in ten years the Federalists won a majority in the assembly, 20–13, and in the council, 7–6. Initially, the War of 1812 resurrected the political fortunes of the Federalist Party. Republicans blamed their defeat on intrigue, divisions within Republican ranks, and improved Federalist organizational skills in two swing counties, Hunterdon and Monmouth. Three years later Republicans finally admitted the "war had uncommon effect on their favor and produced [Federalist] victory."⁴⁰ Federalists credited their victory to the public's misgivings about the war, and it solidified their support in counties where Quakers composed a significant share of the electorate. Clintonian Republican support aided them in several counties, especially in Hunterdon. In addition, many Republicans decided not to vote in 1812 to express their reluctance to support the war. Despite the serious issues debated in 1812, not every voter took the elections seriously. On October 13, 1812 when voters in the Pine Barrens went to vote, the taverns remained open. Voters may have selected the candidate who paid for the most rounds of drinks. While the clear majority of voters took the issue of war or peace seriously some men cared more about their next round of rum or cider royall (highly concentrated cider) than about a declaration of war.

Rather than taking advantage of their triumph, however, Federalists took an unnecessary political gamble that might cost them their majority in the next elections. Although there was lukewarm support for President Madison in 1812, compared to 1808, even among many Republicans some Federalist leaders feared Republicans would carry a statewide vote for the presidency in favor of the incumbent. Instead of




James Schureman

permitting the direct election of presidential electors the Federalist majority in the legislature altered the election law allowing a majority of the *legislature* to choose the electors. New Jersey selected eight electors committed to DeWitt Clinton, the peace candidate in the 1812 presidential campaign. His campaign labeled the War of 1812 as “Mr. Madison’s War.” However, Madison defeated his Republican rival.

In control of the state legislature, Federalists reorganized the congressional election from a statewide general election for all seats to three two-member districts. The election in January 1813, fought on foreign policy issues, sent three anti-war Federalists, one anti-war Clintonian Republican, and two pro-war Republicans to Washington, reflecting the divisions in New Jersey over the War of 1812. James Schureman of New Brunswick, for example, won election to Congress as a Friend for Peace. Antiwar supporters dominated in the local and county elections in New Brunswick. Having a majority in the state legislature permitted Federalists to elect Aaron Ogden as governor for 1812–13, the first Federalist governor in a decade. Ogden agreed to work with Republican Governor Daniel Tompkins of New York to protect New York City from a possible British attack, but opposed using the New Jersey militia to invade Canada. Ogden asked the legislature for additional funds to defend the state and supported anti-war resolutions passed by the Federalist majority. Passage of these resolutions led to an acrimonious debate, with the Republicans repeating the conflict of the earlier Republican-controlled majority’s pro-war resolutions. As the *de facto* head of the Friends of Peace coalition, Ogden continued to condemn the war but endorsed defensive measures to protect the state and nearby New York City and Philadelphia. Governor Ogden proposed a day of prayer and humiliation to protest the wicked war.⁴¹

Foreign policy issues and the War of 1812 dominated the 1813 legislative elections. Federalists, as Friends of Peace, continued to hammer at the wickedness of the war and the mismanagement of the Madison administration. Federalists emphasized the failure to conquer Canada, the misgivings of the militia, war taxes, and high prices for basic goods created by the war. Republicans once again wrapped themselves in the legacy of the Revolution, exaggerated American military victories, denounced the Federalists as Tories, and appealed to patriotism. This time the Republican campaign worked, and they regained control of the legislature, with 31–22 majority. British raids along the coast of New Jersey may have convinced enough voters that the pro-war Republicans would do a better job of defending the state. Some Clintonian Republicans drifted back to the Republican mainstream with the Clinton defeat. This helped Republicans, especially in Hunterdon and Monmouth counties. Those in the legislature elected pro-war William Pennington as governor. Governor Pennington and the Republican majority in the legislature supported pro-war resolutions and expressed confidence in President Madison.

Running on the same issues, Federalists, again as Friends of Peace,



William Pennington

challenged the Republicans in the 1814 campaign. Commenting on the war from Princeton, Federalist Lewis Pintard reflected the views expressed by all Federalists, "what a distressed situation the Country is brought by our rulers and what a shameful resistance has been made to the Enemy on the attack of Washington."⁴² Republicans managed to retain control, however, and the legislature remained unchanged, but Federalists made a partial comeback as the Republican majority in several counties fell. Voters remained uneasy about the war, and a shift of as few as 150 votes would have created a Federalist majority. In the congressional elections Republicans carried all the seats with the Federalists managing to achieve a statewide total of 48% of the vote. Removal of the embargo imposed by the Madison administration from December 1813 to April 1814 denied the Federalists a major economic issue. The British attack on Washington and a perceived threat to the Jersey coast and New York City may have worked to the Republicans' advantage. Pennington retained the governorship for another year. While the Republicans held on to power in New Jersey and viewed their victory as an unqualified support for the war and Madison, Federalist gains from 1813 suggested public concern remained high. The War of 1812 continued to bitterly divide the people of New Jersey in 1814. New Brunswick provided an example of the divisive impact of the war. "Things were very lively, and the political pot was hot. Meetings were held on one night to denounce the war and on the next in favor of it" as Federalists and Republicans competed for the attention and support of the public.⁴³

Although the election of 1815 took place six months after the war ended, the War of 1812 remained the dominant issue. Federalists complained about the costs for so little gained since the Republicans failed to conquer Canada. The Treaty of Ghent ending the war made no mention of impressment or British seizures of American ships and cargoes. From the Federalist perspective the war failed to achieve any of the objectives of President Madison. On the other hand, Republicans interpreted the war as a glorious American victory, a successful second war for independence, a triumph of republicanism over monarchy, and proof of the superiority of the American militiamen over the best trained armies of Europe. Republicans won the 1815 election, solidifying their control of the state, and eliminating the Federalists as a political threat to Republican domination of New Jersey. A majority of New Jerseyans accepted the Republican view of the war as a victory for American nationhood and the republican ideology over the corrupt decadent monarchies of Europe. Federalist victories in 1812, in early 1813, and the near Federalist victory in 1814, represented a protest by the people of New Jersey against the war and policies of President Madison, but not a realignment of New Jersey politics.⁴⁴

Clergy and Quakers

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politicians and average citizens, resulting in Republican and Federalist religious factions. Federalists criticized the political clergy—meaning clergymen who favored Republicans.⁴⁵ Most of the Methodist and Baptist ministers supported the Republican Party. In southern New Jersey, for example, “two-thirds of the Methodists are . . . Democrats and the majority of the preachers . . . are Democrats.”⁴⁶ Virtually all Baptist ministers supported the Republicans. The political affiliations of most Methodist and Baptist clergy in New Jersey followed the nationwide pattern in the early 19th century and during the War of 1812. In Burlington County, for example, Republican political leaders and candidates for office usually belonged to either the Baptist or Methodist denominations. Presbyterian clergy split between the two political parties because many of the political leaders of both the Republican and Federalist parties belonged to the Presbyterian Church. Fourteen of thirty-eight Federalist leaders and thirteen of thirty-three Republicans identified as Presbyterians. Consequently, the clergy of the Presbyterian denomination were the most divided religious group in the state. Nationally, because of these internal divisions, the Presbyterian movement attempted to take a position that would not alienate either Federalists or Republicans. Declaring the war God's punishment for sinful behavior the national church called for days of prayer and humiliation to cleanse the souls of the faithful and the nation. In practice, Presbyterian preachers in New Jersey split into pro-war, anti-war, and neutral factions. One Republican partisan condemned the anti-war clergy in New Jersey. “What must a plain honest man who loves his country and considers treason a crime think of the *pulpit*,” Josiah Simpson of Washington, New Jersey asked, “when he beholds it polluted by such an apostle of Satan as the hypocritical traitor of Byfield.” While Simpson considered himself “a firm Presbyterian, I would sooner witness the final subversion of the sect than see it fraternize with treason and countenance rebellion or cooperate directly or indirectly with the public enemy.”⁴⁷ Simpson's comments reflected the deep divisions the War of 1812 created within congregations and clergy of New Jersey.

At the national level, the Dutch Reformed denomination attempted to stay neutral, but in New Jersey it split into a small pro-war faction that endorsed the Republicans. Ministers who supported the war stood out as a distinct minority. Most of the Dutch-Americans living in Somerset, Bergen, and Middlesex counties opposed the war and voted Federalist. A majority of the clergy agreed and delivered anti-war sermons denouncing the wickedness of the war and endorsing the Friends of Peace. In effect, the Dutch Reformed Church in New Jersey served as auxiliary of the Federalist Party during the War of 1812. New Jersey's Episcopalian denomination shared similar sentiments. A grassroots movement developed among their congregations to observe a day of prayer and humiliation to indicate opposition to the war. Episcopalian leaders hesitated to act because of the Tory

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connections of the denomination during the Revolution and fear that Republicans would denounce them as the new Tories of the War of 1812. However, most Episcopalian congregants and clergy favored the Federalists and opposed the war.⁴⁸

Pro-war clergy proved as partisan and nationalistic as Republican politicians. They provided a religious justification for the war. "The Lord will plead our cause and execute judgment," Dutch Reformed minister Solomon Froeligh predicted.⁴⁹ Ministers who supported the war stressed the role of God in American history. God, they believed, would lead the American armies to victory. Cyrus Gilderleeve, a Presbyterian, delivered a patriotic sermon in support of the war at the Independence Day celebration in Bloomfield in July 1812. Clergy who favored the Republicans emphasized American exceptionalism and the virtues of republicanism over monarchy. Presbyterian Stephen Saunders of Bloomfield preached about American exceptionalism and proclaimed it America's destiny to expand to the Pacific and defeat imperial nations like Great Britain. Presbyterian Abijah Davis expected "on the flesh of kings let vultures feed." To the Federalists Davis epitomized the most extreme fire-and-brimstone pro-war clergyman.⁵⁰ Republican politicians and clergy attacked the anti-war clergy linked to the Federalists. One Republican writer attacked the Federalist clergy for turning the 1813 day of public prayer and humiliation "into the most treasonable abuse, attributing the calamities of the war to the President and those in power."⁵¹ A Republican clergyman railed against the "dabbling, meddling, mischief making" Federalist ministers.⁵²

Federalists made clear where they stood on the wisdom of the war. Members of the Federalist Party appealed to the clergy to "cry loud, spare not, lift up your voices like a trumpet" against the evil war.⁵³ Many heeded this request. Presbyterian minister Peter Kean in Elizabeth spoke out often against the war and the danger of a French alliance during Fourth of July celebrations in 1812. The leading clergymen in Elizabeth and Newark attacked the war and endorsed the Federalists. Presbyterian minister Samuel Whelpley of Newark criticized the Republican leadership during the 1813 day of fasting and humiliation, and after the war became one of the leaders of the American peace movement. Several Presbyterian ministers, like Reverend Green in Princeton, J.L. Shaver in Newton, James Armstrong in Trenton, and George S. Woodhull in Cranbury served as chaplains to the Washington Benevolent Society, a key Federalist political organization. In Burlington County the majority of Presbyterian congregants and clergy favored the Federalist Party. Federalists claimed that the Presbyterian clergy "as a whole opposed the war."⁵⁴ A majority of the Presbyterian, Episcopalian, and Dutch Reformed ministers indeed opposed the war and preferred the Federalists.

As a pacifist religious denomination, the Society of Friends strongly opposed the war. Prior to the declaration of war Army recruiters faced difficulties in signing up men in the heavily Quaker communities in

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southern New Jersey. New Jersey's militia laws permitted Quakers to hire substitutes. Men found it more profitable to serve as a substitute for a Quaker in the militia than volunteer for the militia or Army.⁵⁵ Some Quakers, however, objected to hiring a substitute since it was still supporting war. In lieu of militia service or a substitute, New Jersey's militia laws required Quakers to pay fines. Many objected as well to paying the fines for the same reasons. In such cases, state officials forcibly seized anything that they could sell to pay the fines—corn, cordwood, riding carriages, tons of hay, and even teaspoons. Amelia Mott Gummere, a 19th century historian of Burlington's Quakers, concluded that “property of almost every description, from 6 teaspoons to several tons of hay, fell into the hands of the military, who claimed all they could get from the ‘Quakers’”⁵⁶ Quakers resented this heavy handedness in seizing their property, but it represented the penalty they had to pay for remaining true to their conscience.

Some Quakers refused to do anything that would directly or indirectly aid the war. Quaker shopkeeper Isaac Martin, who resided in Rahway, refused to pay taxes levied on the sale of imported goods because it would help finance the war. To avoid trouble, Martin turned away customers rather than sell the taxed goods. The financial losses were “worth suffering” to take a stand against an unnecessary conflict.⁵⁷ African-American Quaker David Mapps would not transport cannon balls, because it helped support the military. The owner of the Batsto forge, Colonel William Richards, needed Mapps to carry a cargo of cannon balls on the schooner Mapps owned tied up on the Mullica River down to Little Egg Harbor, and from there to New York City. Mapps frequently carried freight between Little Egg Harbor and New York. “I’d like to oblige thee,” responded Mapps, “but I cannot carry the devil's pills that were made to kill people.”⁵⁸ Attempts by Richards to persuade Mapps to carry the cargo of needed military supplies failed to move the Quaker who refused to contribute to the prosecution of the war. Another African-American Quaker, a farmer, stopped selling produce to an iron foundry because it started making cannons. A few Quakers went further, refusing to pay militia fines and willingly went to jail for their obstinacy. When the war ended many Quakers in Burlington County refused to illuminate their houses in celebration of peace because they viewed the War of 1812 as immoral, unjust, unnecessary and having led to the loss of life for no purpose. Quakers tended to vote Federalist before the war, but the declaration of war solidified their participation in the Friends of Peace and their identification with the anti-war Federalists.

After the war, Quakers resented the continued mandatory attendance at militia trainings and fines levied for failure to attend them.⁵⁹ Although Federalists generally opposed the militia trainings, Quakers in Burlington County did not feel that their Assemblymen did enough to stop the drills. They sought exemption from fines, but the state legislature did not exempt Quakers. By 1817, it became a political

A rich trade emerged during the war between ships in Delaware Bay and New York City as smugglers in New Jersey carried the imported items across the state.

issue that split the Federalist Party in Burlington and Gloucester counties over how far Federalists should go to endorse the demands of Quakers. Besides using the vote to pressure politicians on the militia issue, Quakers devised strategies to evade the militia laws. In Upper Greenwich and Mantua, Gloucester County, Quakers succeeded in electing Quakers as captains of the militia. The Quaker officers simply never called militia drills, making the militia laws null and void in towns with Quaker majorities.

Quakers also developed other strategies. State laws made fire companies exempt from mandatory militia trainings, so every male Quaker in Salem joined the local fire company! In Burlington County, when their efforts to change the law failed, Quakers decided on another way to neutralize militia drills. They arrived wearing no shoes, parting their hair like Native Americans, and carrying chicken feathers attached to sticks as weapons. Other Quakers showed up at drills with painted faces wearing a clown's baggy pants. Other Quakers refrained from such mockery and instead embraced this as an issue of conscience by simply refusing to pay militia fines and going to jail. Through a combination of clever evasions, outright hostility, and mockery, Quakers in Salem, Burlington, and Gloucester counties nullified the militia laws in communities where they formed a majority of the male population. They continued their protests until the state abolished imprisonment for non-payment of militia fines in 1844.⁶⁰

Smuggling

During the War of 1812 widespread trade with the enemy still developed in northern and western New York along where Lake Champlain is shared by New York and Vermont, along eastern Maine, and the Georgia/Florida border. New Jersey's location made it a less likely venue for smuggling, but the presence of British ships off the Jersey coast and in Delaware Bay for most of the war proved a temptation that some could not resist. "A great supply of smuggled goods" reached New York City via Delaware Bay and the Jersey coast.⁶¹ Smugglers transferred goods from American, British, and other foreign ships in Delaware Bay to Durham boats that went up the Delaware River to Lambertton (South Trenton). At Lambertton, smugglers unloaded the boats and transported the goods overland to the Raritan River at New Brunswick for shipment to New York City. A rich trade emerged during the war between ships in Delaware Bay and New York City as smugglers in New Jersey carried the imported items across the state. This was a two-way trade as merchandise from New York was transported back across the Garden State to the same ships in Delaware Bay, also via Durham boats. Even when the British attempted to impose a blockade of the Jersey coast the smuggling continued. Occasionally, customs officers recovered some of the smuggled merchandise. In one raid in December 1813 on an informant's tip, customs officers located \$25,000 worth of illegal goods in a warehouse

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in Newark. Townspeople, however, were angry at the informer for interfering in the profitable if illegal trade. The Republican newspaper in Newark, *Centinel*, defended the informer's conduct for upholding the law putting patriotism above profit.⁶²

Delaware newspapers reported that most of the supplies that fed the British blockading squadron came from New Jersey. Even the Republican newspaper editor and politician James Wilson confirmed that the British received most of its "supplies from New Jersey." His paper admitted that "an intercourse had been kept up between their ships of war and the inhabitants of some parts of our coast."⁶³ A resident of Cape May reported that the trade between the people of Cape May and British warships "is becoming almost continual"⁶⁴ Flour from New Jersey fed the British armies in Spain and Portugal. Most of the flour produced in New Jersey that went to New York City and that transported across the state from Pennsylvania went to the British armies. Each week in November 1813 1,500 teams of three, four, or five horses carried flour from the Delaware to the Raritan rivers destined for New York City. Neutral vessels then transported the cargo to Europe. The high prices paid for transporting flour across New Jersey induced several pro-war Republicans to enter "heart, hand, wagons, and horses into the trade of transporting flour and other articles of aid and comfort . . . to our *enemies*."⁶⁵ Federalist publisher George Sherman gloated that the Republicans involved in the illicit flour trade included none other than Republican leader James Wilson.

Profit trumped patriotism as pro-war Republicans could not refrain from taking advantage of the war-induced profits from the indirect trade with the British via European ports. The abundance of agricultural produce grown in the Garden State, and the ability to transport the produce via New Jersey's many rivers by Durham boat enhanced the opportunities to smuggle flour and other goods to New York City and from there to European ports. A New York City merchant commented on the profits brought by the trade. "We have profited wonderfully by the war," noted Miles Smith, "particularly New Jersey by the trade with Lisbon."⁶⁶ In 1813 Republicans blamed smuggling on the lack of enforcement by anti-war Federalist Governor Ogden, but the smuggling continued uninterrupted under his successor, Republican William Pennington in 1813–1814. Smuggling continued unabated until the war ended and neither the state or federal governments proved capable of ending the profitable if illegal trade with the enemy.

Militia

At the outbreak of the war many New Jersey militia units remained unprepared. Militia units reported to Governor Ogden in the fall of 1812 and summer of 1813 that lacked arms and ammunition, or their arms were unfit for service. Captain John Lambert of the First Artillery Company of the Hunterdon Brigade informed the Governor that he had "know [sic] guns that is suitable for actual service."⁶⁷ An officer of the

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First Regiment of the Monmouth County Brigade told Governor Ogden that his regiment had “guns of different sizes and calibers” and most of the weapons were “not fit for actual service.”⁶⁸ Similarly, Captain Samuel Bellegrean of the Trenton Light Infantry Company concluded in December 1812, that “the state of our guns and bayonets is not fit for service.”⁶⁹ Captain William Cutler of the First Middlesex Brigade found that his militia unit was “almost totally deficient of arms fit for defense not having more than six muskets in the company that will pass muster.”⁷⁰ From every part of the state, militia officers complained about the lack of arms and ammunition or the defective nature of the weapons their units could muster. Many militiamen could not afford the costs of equipping themselves as the state laws required. A captain from a company in Somerset County informed the governor that his unit lacked rifles because “a great number of the men from want of pecuniary means are unable to go to much expense.”⁷¹ Additional expenditures by Federalist and Republican state administrations did not necessarily solve the problem.

As late as 1814, even the Republican press published stories of the lack of preparedness of some militia companies. As late as 1814 an officer stationed at the camp at the Navesink Highlands wrote a letter to a Newark newspaper about the lack of preparedness of men in his militia unit and the “arms are out of order.”⁷² This candid letter expressed the frustration of some officers at the continued lack of preparedness. The officer believed that only a poorly trained and ill-equipped militia defended the Jersey coast from a British invasion. To shore up the defenses the officer went to Amboy, appealing to its citizens to contribute to the cost of “powder and ball for each man.”⁷³

Men not on active duty did not take militia drills very seriously, even during the actual outbreak of the War of 1812. Trainings in the Pine Barrens were “little more than a joke.”⁷⁴ Because militia trainings were often held near taverns, men spent more time drinking than training. In the Pine Barrens the militia men often came from the workers at the iron foundries. Training consisted of consuming large amounts of mimbo (rum and muscovado sugar), metheglin (mead, water, and herbs), whiskey, gin, beer, or rum. Officers shouted orders “but no one obeyed.”⁷⁵ Fights frequently broke out after a day of trainings and men limped home with injuries sustained in this unplanned field of battle. Training days remained the same before, during, and after the War of 1812. One man got so drunk during training in May’s Landing that he hung himself twice but “did not hang long enough” to prove fata1.⁷⁶ Some men returned home from a day of training “very abusive to their families . . . and unfit for work the next day.”⁷⁷ During the 1815 militia training at Martha’s Furnace in Burlington County, men imbibed so much liquor they could not work for several days.⁷⁸ This happened throughout the state, from May’s Landing to Jersey City even after the war began. Some of the officers did not set good examples for their troops. Officers on Training Days in the Pine Barrens often became as

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intoxicated as their men—sometimes too drunk to command. Captain Townsend of Martha, went too far, and authorities court-martialed him at Bodine's Tavern on April 1, 1814, “for being too drunk to give orders.”⁷⁹ At the outbreak of the war some members of the clergy complained at the “lax discipline that pervades our militia meetings.”⁸⁰

While the intention of the training days was to prepare the militia in case of war, at its best, they turned into social events. Militia in Bergen County paraded for the community, and trainings attracted large crowds to watch the men on parade. The sight of the officers in their colorful uniforms, often on horseback, impressed the crowds. For the militia, the height of the training day was a grand supper held at local tavern in Jersey City.⁸¹ Training days in the Pine Barrens attracted an audience of working men and residents of the Martha area. They became festive occasions as the sound of drums and fifes “put a sense of celebration in the air.” Officers wore “stunning blue American uniforms” braided “in gold and studded with brass” impressing the spectators, but not always the men they commanded.⁸² Accounts from Atlantic and Gloucester counties suggest the training days during and after the War of 1812 provided a “real frolic” and general amusement for the audience and the men training. “At its height, however, no one could deny that the annual muster was a gala affair.”⁸³ In Somerset County training days turned into joyous holidays with a carnival like atmosphere. People would come from around the county to watch the men march and drill. Vendors sold cakes, pastry, beer, rum and hard cider. Horse races and gambling “were frequent features of the occasion.” As the day ended the influence of alcoholic beverages often led to “turbulence and riot.”⁸⁴

Despite the lax discipline and general frivolity, initially at least, the militia appeared enthusiastic to serve and defend the state against possible British invaders. William Garrison, Captain of a Light Infantry Company in Somerset County, pledged that his men were “ready to defend our just rites and liberties.” Garrison's unit would cheerfully give up their lives “rather than become “tributary to any foreign nation.”⁸⁵ From Cumberland County, Captain William Potter of the Union Light Infantry Company wrote that his unit was ready “to prove themselves a race of Jersey men, not unworthy of their Fathers.”⁸⁶ Prior to the declaration of war, Republicans in May 1812 expected that volunteers would provide the necessary manpower. By June, however, the zeal had subsided and the Republicans admitted “companies were but partially filled.”⁸⁷ The Federalist press emphasized that the lack of volunteers would require the state to draft men for militia service.⁸⁸ As early as the summer of 1812, some men serving in the militia refused to serve outside the state. Men refused, for instance, orders to go to Fort Richmond on Staten Island. Officers had to force the men into the boats, threatening to kill those who disobeyed. As one Federalist newspaper stressed “only threats of their officers induced them to obey.”⁸⁹ Efforts to form a volunteer militia company in Ocean County

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initially failed. When the state called out men in the shore village of Long Beach Island to defend the coast the men found an alternative course of action. The state needed one in seven men to protect the coast from British incursions, but the men decided to avoid unwanted service by banding together to hire substitutes for fifty dollars.⁹⁰ Militia men took out some of their frustrations at forced garrison duty by not taking care of their weapons and other military supplies “as if to break and destroy was a merit and not a disgrace for a soldier.”⁹¹

Before the 1812 congressional elections, Federalists warned that if the Republicans won “your brothers and sons torn from their homes, as *conscripts* and marched into Canada, to be slaughtered before the fortress of Quebec.”⁹² After the Federalists gained control of the state government militia units followed the Federalist lead “by refusing to serve outside the state.”⁹³ In 1813 and 1814, militia troops, especially conscripts, resented the separation from their families, the poor food, and service under regular army officers. The poor condition of supplies forced even officers to protest. On October 22, 1814, all the Captains commanding companies, serving under Brigadier-General Elmer, stationed at Billingsport, held a meeting to express their disgust “that the provisions are bad and unwholesome, especially the beef” Most of the beef provided by contractors to the militia was “bad and absolutely stinking.” All the Captains agreed that provisions determined to be spoiled, “both bread and beef . . . should be immediately destroyed.”⁹⁴ Conscripts from New Brunswick sent to camps at Middletown and Highlands resented serving under regular army officers and the lack of “proper care and food.”⁹⁵ Other militia units sent to Sandy Hook from the Jersey shore did not enjoy meals of horsemeat and gunboat turkey (salt pork).⁹⁶

Resentment at their treatment led some militiamen to desert. During the summer of 1813 men from New Brunswick units “left for their homes in groups at every chance they had.” They did not view themselves as “deserters or ought to be treated as such.” Conscripted militia hated the forced garrison duty.⁹⁷ Men from south Jersey also tired of militia service in the summer of 1813 and left for home. Reports from Major William Potter in August 1813 indicated that thirty-seven men deserted in one week from his Cumberland County company. Several other companies from the southern part of the state, especially from Burlington and Gloucester counties, reported many men leaving for home. Desertion emerged as a major problem for militia companies from the summer of 1813 until the end of the war. Many militiamen, whether volunteer or conscripted, did not want to serve more than three months at a time. The ill-equipped and ill-supplied military camps discouraged some men from living up to their military obligations and the proximity of home and family encouraged men to leave.⁹⁸

On July 5, 1813, the return of the militiamen from New Brunswick created a riot in the city when regular Army troops arrived to arrest the deserters. Troops succeeded in capturing some of them, but local

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townspeople resented the ill-treatment the captured men received. A donnybrook ensued between the militiamen and townspeople on one side and the U.S. Army cavalry on the other. Some militiamen managed to escape custody, but the cavalry recaptured most. The Common Council of New Brunswick protested the cavalry's actions and most New Brunswick tavern keepers joined in a city-wide action by refusing to serve any soldiers from the U.S. Army. Frequent desertions created repeated confrontations in New Brunswick in 1813. New Brunswick's mayor encouraged the Common Council to draft a petition demanding that none of the militia from the New Brunswick area should be sent out of state.⁹⁹ Anti-war Federalists capitalized on this animosity between residents of New Brunswick and U.S. Army and the conscription of the militia. Federalists argued that the drafted militia were being treated like French conscripts in the armies of Napoleon.¹⁰⁰

By the summer of 1813, Republicans admitted widespread desertions of men in the militia. Even volunteers and drafted men from solidly Republican towns preferred to serve only for three months. As an example, the Whig Society, in solidly Republican Woodbridge, expressed its dismay at the extended service of men from the town. This Republican auxiliary political organization (equivalent to the Federalist Washington Society) demanded in August 1813 that Governor Ogden release its militia detachment. "These men are very discontented," they informed the Governor and wanted an immediate discharge. They admitted that some men would not wait until discharged and "desertions are very frequent." Service longer than three months would discourage the men from serving the next time the state called them out. "None will go" the Republicans warned, and they will "prefer to pay their fines of \$50." Punishment of deserters produced further discontent among the militia for "this cannot but increase the opposition and hostility to the general government."¹⁰¹ Neither Federalists nor Republicans preferred to serve more than three months at a stretch by the summer of 1813. Many voted with their feet and opted for their home and family—whether in Federalist New Brunswick or Republican Woodbridge.¹⁰¹

Similar problems plagued the militia in 1814. Republican appeals to patriotism and the availability of new uniforms did not motivate men to volunteer. As historian Robert Rodgers concluded, "not even the promise of this gala attire brought the volunteers flocking."¹⁰² When only a total of 818 men volunteered in New Jersey the state drafted 3,863. No one volunteered at all in Burlington, Gloucester, Cumberland, Cape May, or Monmouth counties. Very few volunteered in Bergen and Sussex. In Sussex, a heavily-Republican county, thirty-two men volunteered, but a further 598 had to be drafted. Large numbers of volunteers came forward in Essex, Somerset, Salem, and Morris counties. The only places a reasonable number of volunteers showed up relative to draftees were in Hunterdon and Middlesex counties.¹⁰³ Even in exposed coastal areas subject to British raids it proved difficult

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to form volunteer units. Men were drafted to staff units stationed at fortifications or sent to patrol the shore.¹⁰⁴ When a militia unit from New Brunswick volunteered to protect the town from possible British attack, it was sent instead to another part of the state. The men protested and Governor Pennington, after failing to persuade the men to remain on duty, agreed to release them to go home.¹⁰⁵ Desertions continued to pose a significant enough issue that Republican newspaper editors publicized the \$50 reward for turning in deserters.¹⁰⁶ Newspaper editors hoped a mixture of greed and patriotism would encourage citizens to turn them in. Despite all the Republican rhetoric, party leaders could not induce most of the rank and file to step forward and volunteer for militia service, and Federalists succeeded in convincing many of their followers to serve only if drafted. The lack of willingness to volunteer reflected “the absence of enthusiasm” for militia service during the War of 1812 in New Jersey.¹⁰⁷

New Jersey's failure to pay the militia on time contributed to the desertion rate and even led to mutiny, pushing officers to use threats of force to keep men from mass desertion. On March 23, 1814 the men stationed at Fort Gates on Sandy Hook held a general meeting and voted, except for the Third Artillery, “one and all” to refuse “to obey orders of the officers to appear on parade.” Some of the men had served for seven months without pay. Officers tried to persuade the men to reconsider, but failed. Captain James Hamilton “ordered two six pounders placed in front of the barracks, loaded the guns, gave men ten minutes to appear on parade.” It took the threat of opening fire on his own troops to get the men to come out. Hamilton arrested the ringleaders and sent them for court martial.¹⁰⁸ By the spring of 1814, many of the men in the New Jersey militia just wanted to go home. During the fall the number of desertions increased as New Jersey's citizen soldiers expressed their preferences by heading for home.

Defense

Republican Governor Joseph Bloomfield resigned the governorship to accept the rank of brigadier general in the U.S. Army, and command of the Third Military District based in New York City. During the War of 1812 the primary role of the militia from New Jersey was to defend New York City and, secondarily, defend Philadelphia in case of a British attack. Paulus Hook, now Jersey City, “an elevated peninsula surrounded by swamps and water with a commanding view of the Hudson River and New York Harbor” became a major training center and camp of the New Jersey militia.¹⁰⁹ The village contained less than a dozen houses and a couple of stores in 1812. Earthworks surrounding a barracks and parade ground remained from the Revolution. The state expanded the site into the major training camp for the war and built an armory for munitions, equipment, and other military supplies. Soon after the war began, Robert Fulton's steamboat *Jersey* transported troops from Paulus Hook to New York City, “a historic first, the transport

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of troops across water by steam powered craft."¹¹⁰ Throughout the war the ferry service between Paulus Hook and New York City played a key role in transporting men and military supplies to shore up defenses on both sides of the Hudson. New Jersey militiamen reported to Paulus Hook for equipment and assignment to military sites on Harlem Heights, Staten Island, Highlands of the Navesink, or Sandy Hook. The strategic location of Paulus Hook made it a militia hub for the duration of the war.

When Federalist Governor Ogden became governor, he opposed the war in principle, but agreed to cooperate with Republican Governor Daniel Tompkins of New York to defend New York City. Ogden held dinners with militia officers in Trenton and Newark in December 1812. Governor Ogden encouraged the militia officers to do their duty in support of the war effort, defend the state, and New York City if the British attacked. In General Orders, issued on March 24, 1813, Ogden reminded each militiaman of his responsibility to provide arms, powder, and ball, and “it should be his pride, to be the proprietor and constant possessor of those arms and equipment without which he cannot perform his duty or defend his country.”¹¹¹ The Federalist controlled legislature, however, adopted resolutions against sending militiamen out of state and attacked the war. Governor Ogden agreed with the criticism of this “vile and unnecessary war” and opposed sending militia to Canada, but felt an obligation to defend the state and New York City. Republican successor William Pennington issued similar orders to the militia. Pennington’s January 1814 message emphasized the limitations of the militia: “It is next to impossible that the great body of militia should acquire much proficiency in tactics and discipline.”¹¹² Later in the year Pennington recommended a more permanent state military force, in effect, a state army, a “military corps of more durability than is compatible with the nature of militia service,”¹¹³ but the legislature failed to act before the end of the war.

Meanwhile, the New Jersey militia assumed station on Fort Richmond on Staten Island, Billingsport on the Delaware, Navesink Highlands, Spermaceti Cove on the bay side of Sandy Hook, and Sandy Hook, “the farthest outpost of New York harbor defenses.”¹¹⁴ Major Horace Holden, stationed on the Navesink Highlands in 1814, considered “these lovely heights . . . one of the most delightful spots ever presented to the human eye.”¹¹⁵ Troops sent to the Navesink Highlands had an excellent view of New York harbor and enemy vessels. Men on Sandy Hook could advise of an enemy landing and might repel an initial attack. After leaving the “enchanted place” on the Highlands, Holden and his militiamen went to Camp Liberty on Sandy Hook, “the most inhospitable sand heap that was ever trod upon by the foot of man.”¹¹⁶ Block houses were constructed to provide partial protection for the militia on the Highlands, Spermaceti Cove, and Sandy Hook. In 1813 barracks and Fort Gates were built on Sandy Hook as it emerged as a major defense post for the New Jersey militia. A semi-

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regular federal force, Sea Fencibles, established in 1812 to man coastal fortifications and gunboats manned Fort Gates. Militiamen pitched tents at Camp Liberty on Sandy Hook. An elaborate signal system developed to provide warning of the British. Cannons on the Highlands would fire and the “lowering or hoisting of large black and while balls on masts” would send a message to Signal Hill on Staten Island and then to Governor’s Island or Brooklyn’s Navy Yard in fifteen minutes.¹¹⁷ Pennington, an artilleryman from the Revolution, ordered the construction of smaller forts and gun emplacements along the coast from Sandy Hook to Cape May. He went on a personal tour of inspection selecting the best sites for the placement of artillery to protect the Jersey shore from British raiding parties.

Fearing attack after the British assault on Washington and Baltimore in the summer of 1814, Governor Pennington called up 5,000 members of the militia in July 1814 to defend the state, New York City, and Philadelphia. The state mobilized 3,600 in August and half went to Sandy Hook and Paulus Hook. Governor Pennington assured Governor Tompkins of New York if the British appeared ready to attack the city he will order the Essex County militia and militia from adjacent counties to “repair immediately to that part of the state nearest the harbor of New York, to cooperate in its defense.”¹¹⁸ The Newark *Centinel* viewed the departure of the militia from Essex and Morris counties for the camp at Paulus Hook on September 3, 1814 as the “the most brilliant and warlike we have ever witnessed in Newark.”¹¹⁹ Unfortunately, the military appearance belied the lack of military preparedness. Even in the middle of this apparent crisis an officer of the Essex County militia noted that his militia unit at Sandy Hook lacked ammunition and their muskets did not work. He urged citizens to call town meetings throughout the state to solicit donations for ammunition for the militia stationed at Paulus Hook and Sandy Hook.¹²⁰ Citizen soldiers in the militia bore the responsibility to provide their own weapons, horses, and ammunition. Even in the middle of a war with the danger of a British invasion, many militiamen lacked adequate arms, ammunition, and other military supplies.

Average citizens joined in helping build fortifications on Harlem Heights and Brooklyn Heights. Groups of men from five hundred to one thousand strong, often led by ministers, left Morris and Essex counties, marching to music and carrying flags with messages like “Don’t give up the ship,” or “Don’t give up the soil.”¹²¹ Two hundred militiamen from Newark volunteered in August to work on Brooklyn’s fortifications. Several hundred citizens from Paterson went to work at Brooklyn Heights. One group of seventy-six residents from Paterson got special notice and attention when they went to work on Brooklyn’s fortifications on August 17, 1814. Dressed in military uniforms and led by a veteran Revolutionary officer, Colonel Abraham Godwin, they walked to Paulus Hook to catch the ferry. Upon arriving in New York, they continued their march across Manhattan to the sound of “martial music and colors flying” as they embarked for Brooklyn exciting “the liveliest feelings of

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patriotism and enthusiasm in the spectators.”¹²² Eight hundred citizens of Newark, in September 1814, accompanied by bands, went in a line of wagons to the ferry at Paulus Hook for New York to work on the Brooklyn fortifications. Several bands cheered on the volunteers from Newark, flags waved in support, and each volunteer wore a hat bearing the message “Don’t Give up the Soil.” Newspapers in New York City expressed their gratitude to the help coming from New Jersey. According to the New York *Columbian*: “Newark will forever live in the grateful remembrance of the people of New York.”¹²³

The people of New Jersey expressed concern that the British would land and invade New Jersey, attacking Newark and New Brunswick, and raid the Jersey shore as well as occupying New York as they did during the Revolution. Because of the perceived risk, the state recruited several militia companies for longer service, such as several Gloucester County artillery and infantry companies sent to protect the Jersey shore at Somers Point, Great Egg Harbor, and Leeds Point, or the infantry company organized by Captain Jacob Butcher from Monmouth County (now Ocean County) that manned sites at Long Branch, Deal, and Barnegat Inlet. The state established additional militia warning posts in Elizabethtown, Newark, Springfield, Bloomfield, Caldwell, and Paterson in case the British invaded. Artillerymen would fire warning shots at the first sight of the enemy. Newark established a night warning system consisting of cannons firing three shots and beacon fires lighted as soon as the cannons fired to warn of the approach of the British. Horsemen would gallop from the first alarm station to spread the news and provide details of the enemy’s location.

Also, fearing British attack in the summer of 1814, Philadelphia organized a Committee of Defense and requested Governor Pennington send most of the troops from south Jersey to defend the Delaware Valley. The Philadelphia committee wanted most of the men serving in General Ebenezer Elmer’s militia brigade to protect their city. Governor Pennington refused, however, because the troops were needed to shore up defenses on the Jersey side of New York harbor. Members of the Philadelphia defense committee “angrily replied that ‘the defense of the Delaware was equally important with that of the Jersey shores of New York harbor.’”¹²⁴ Pennington did not budge and continued to refuse the request. Pennington reasonably believed that a British assault on New York City and the Jersey shore was a more likely possibility than invasion of the Delaware Valley.

The defense committee then appealed to former New Jersey Governor Joseph Bloomfield, who in 1814, after serving a term of service on the northern frontier of New York, commanded the Fourth Military District that comprised the Delaware Valley. Bloomfield ordered part of Ebenezer Elmer’s brigade to remain at Billingsport to protect Philadelphia, asserting federal authority over the state commander of the militia, Governor William Pennington. Unfortunately for Pennington, federal authority superseded state military command. Pennington



Daniel Tompkins

resented that Governor Daniel Tompkins, who commanded the Third Military District in 1814, controlled the New Jersey militia on the Jersey shore protecting New York harbor. Secretary of War James Monroe appointed Tompkins commander of the Third Military District. Pennington appealed to Secretary Monroe that the New York governor could not command New Jersey troops within the boundaries of New Jersey, but his appeal failed. Tompkins had a federal military appointment, making Pennington subordinate to the New York governor's authority. The New Jersey militia stationed along New York harbor, from Paulus Hook to Sandy Hook, fell under the command of Governor Tompkins.¹²⁵

British Raids

"Heard the Report of Firing between the Enemy and our boats in Little Egg Harbor," recorded the captain of the British frigate *Niemen* on May 23, 1814.¹²⁶ Six barges sent from the British frigate captured four American schooners in Little Egg Harbor. On the following day, the British captain sent the American schooners to Halifax, Nova Scotia, for condemnation and sale as prizes of war. Three times between January and October 1814 *Niemen* cruised off the Jersey shore attempting to attack and capture coastal vessels, concentrating particularly on stopping shipping from Little Egg Harbor. *Niemen* was one of several British warships that sailed off the Jersey coast from Sandy Hook to the Maurice River attacking ships entering or leaving New York harbor, Philadelphia, or ports along the Jersey shore. British warships sent barges and small boats to capture smaller vessels and raid the Jersey shore for cattle, chickens, pigs, sheep, and grain as well as land to replenish water supplies.

In 1813 and 1814, residents of the Jersey coast lived in constant fear of such British raids. Silas Crane, Collector of Customs at Little Egg Harbor, refused to hold any money, public or private, because his town was in "continual jeopardy [from] our exposure to the enemy."¹²⁷ The inhabitants of Long Branch appealed to Governor Ogden for arms and ammunition because they feared a British invasion. In response to their concerns, the state sent one hundred men from the Gloucester County brigade to a small fort built overlooking the Great Egg Harbor River. In Salem County residents "are a little afraid of the British" landing and stealing cattle, and "the people of Salem are very much frightened."¹²⁸ The Salem County board of freeholders, twice in 1813 and 1814, ordered the county clerk "to arrange the papers of his office in such a manner that the speedy removal of them can be effected."¹²⁹ Residents of Cape May County buried their valuables "and were prepared to move inland at the moments warning" of a British landing. Farmers prepared to drive their cattle into the woods if the British landed on the coast.¹³⁰

Militia were sent to watch for the British and protect the Jersey shore. One of the men from the Camden Blues, a company sent to patrol the South Jersey shore, may have summed up the feelings of

These raids terrified the people of Cumberland County, and the “distress of the women and children was extravagant.”

many fellow militiamen. Carriage-maker Isaac Van Scriver fell asleep on duty and when a thunder storm woke him up he shouted, “Jerusalem! That’s either the British or the Day of Judgment, and I am not ready for either.”¹³¹ Whether ready or not the militia faced the British. Beginning in early 1813, British warships blockaded Delaware Bay and New York harbor or cruised off the Jersey shore looking for American vessels to seize. On April 19, 1813, for example, a British warship drove three oyster boats into Cedar Creek, and British seamen, transported in barges, set the oyster boats afire. The militia arrived and the British opened fire. None of the British or Americans were injured in this exchange of musket fire. However, over the next couple of days British barges cruised between the mouth of Cedar Creek and the Cohansey capturing several shallops.¹³²

A few weeks later, a British schooner appeared off Fishing Creek and landed two to three hundred men who seized 130 head of cattle and 45 sheep before the militia arrived. To discourage the raiding parties the militia placed a twelve-foot cannon at the mouth of Fishing Creek, but it failed to deter the British. For years after the War of 1812 local farmers plowed up cannon balls fired by the British to knock out the Fishing Creek cannon. Repeated British raiding parties landing on the Cape May coast seized so many livestock, and barges captured so many vessels that a local resident wrote, “this county has suffered more loss of vessels and other property in the space of three months than we lost during the whole of the revolutionary war.”¹³³ On May 30, 1813 the British landed sixty men near Leesburg in Cumberland County. Three hundred militiamen from Cumberland County appeared and a battle ensued, but the overwhelming American numbers forced the British to withdraw. These raids terrified the people of Cumberland County, and the “distress of the women and children was extravagant.”¹³⁴

One of the most famous incidents of British raids along the Jersey shore took place on March 31, 1813, when the British 74-gun *Ramilles*, the flagship of the British blockading squadron, anchored off Barnegat Inlet and sent four barges with armed sailors to capture American coasters. Seamen from the barges boarded the schooner *Greyhound* of Potter’s Creek and while taking the schooner out of the inlet it went aground. The seamen set the schooner and its cargo aflame. Members of the raiding party sank, burned, or captured four other coasting vessels between Waretown and Forked River. That night the flames from the burning American coasters could be seen for miles along the bay. Terrified the British might proceed up the bay to Waretown, residents sent their wives and children into the woods for safety.¹³⁵

Further up the coast, a major incident occurred in November 1813 when the 74-gun *Plantagenet* drove the American schooner *Sparrow* aground at Long Branch. While the British attempted to refloat the schooner, residents sent word to the American gunboat squadron at Spermaceti Cove. Troops arrived from the gunboats and fifty local men showed up to retake the schooner. Initially, the Americans opening fire

British naval
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with the
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cargo to and
from
European
ports in
Delaware
Bay.

on the British startled them, and they "retreated in such hurry and confusion, as to leave several of their cartouch boxes with cartridges, and to omit to set fire to the schooner."¹³⁶ *Plantagenet* approached within a quarter mile of the grounded schooner and opened fire on the Americans. With no cover available, the men laid prostrate on the beach. Fire from *Plantagenet* destroyed the schooner, but the Americans saved the cargo. The bombardment killed one American and wounded thirty other men.

Militia and Sea Fencibles at Sandy Hook found themselves watching the British blockading squadron. Sometimes they exchanged fired with the British squadron of warships off Sandy Hook who fired upon coasting vessels and attempted to stop and search every vessel leaving or entering New York's harbor. Major Horace Holden, stationed at Sandy Hook in 1814, observed three British warships "endeavoring to prevent our merchant vessels and coasting craft from gaining the narrows and frequently fired upon them."¹³⁷ Members of the Sea Fencibles retaliated when the British opened fire by loading their cannons with hot shot, "cannon balls heated red hot before loading" hoping to set the warships afire.¹³⁸ Holden noted that the militia joined in, "most courageously returned their shots with red hot balls but they never reached the enemy" and the Americans on Sandy Hook remained out of range of the British cannon balls.¹³⁹ Charles Dally, at "Camp Highlands" wrote to his wife Nancy on September 13, 1813, "there is a British ship now in sight. Yesterday she came so nigh in after the smacks that the gunboats" in Spermaceti Cove "fired at her." A few days earlier Dally's company was called out in case the warship which "came so nigh" landed armed seamen, but it did not.¹⁴⁰ On October 19, 1814, Captain John Logan of Peapack, stationed at Camp Liberty on Sandy Hook, witnessed an American privateer's vessel "hugging close to the shore as possible" when a British frigate "began to fire on her" and continued to fire on the American vessel. American gunboats rounded Sandy Hook to help the prize ship, and Sea Fencibles at the blockhouse "fired their long tom [gun] on the British." Several rifle companies rushed to the beach to provide cover. Fire from the blockhouse forced the frigate to withdraw, but the British still fired at the American vessel. However, the "vessel came on safely and proved to be a prize taken" later by a privateer from Baltimore.¹⁴¹ Much of the action proved a stalemate as troops at Sandy Hook and the Highlands frequently fired at the British warships but failed to hit them and the British did not appear to have injured the Americans—although Horace Holden remembered that the British shot came "near enough" before his service ended in December 1814.¹⁴²

British naval officers followed an inconsistent policy in dealing with Americans. They did not interfere with the smuggling of cargo to and from European ports in Delaware Bay. This may have been motivated in part to undercut the Madison Administration's temporary embargoes on trade during the war. It served the interests of the British to allow

A man
interrupted a
concert at the
City Hotel
and jumped
on a table
crying
“Peace!
Peace!”

American grain from New Jersey and Pennsylvania to reach British troops fighting Napoleon. Some British naval officers like Commodore Thomas Hardy, offered to pay for cattle needed by the British blockading squadrons. At the same time, the British frequently raided the New Jersey coast, seized and destroyed coasting vessels, and made it difficult for the people of south Jersey to transport lumber to New York City, devastating the lumber trade in 1813–1814. British raids terrified the residents of the Jersey coast from Sandy Hook to Delaware Bay.

Peace

One Cape May woman summed up the feelings of many in New Jersey, “there was great rejoicing when finally, the war closed, and the enemy’s ships were called home.”¹⁴³ On the afternoon of February 11, 1815, the British sloop of war *Favorite* off Sandy Hook informed the British blockading ships *Endymion* and *Tenedos* she carried a copy of the Treaty of Ghent. The treaty of peace, also known as the Peace of Christmas Eve, negotiated in Ghent, Belgium, ended the War of 1812. Under a flag of truce, *Favorite* entered New York harbor and delivered the news of peace. The sudden end to the war quickly spreads to the city’s newspapers, and some published extra editions of the glad tidings of the war’s end. A man interrupted a concert at the City Hotel, and jumped on a table crying “Peace! Peace!” People marched down Broadway carrying candles, lamps, and torches in a spontaneous demonstration of joy at the end of war.¹⁴⁴

In an age long before rapid electronic communication, it took about a week for the news of peace to reach all the communities in New Jersey. Cities and villages alike organized celebrations all around the state. Samuel Mickle recorded in his diary that on February 18, 1815, “Woodbury generally illuminated tonight in consequence of peace between U. S. & Great Britain.”¹⁴⁵ On February 20th, a copy of the Treaty of Ghent reached Elizabeth. At 2:00 P.M. citizens of the town gathered at the Presbyterian church “and united in offering thanks to a kind Providence for this joyful event.” After listening to a short speech by Rev. J. McDowell the citizens celebrated the news by firing eighteen guns, church bells were rung for an hour, and “in the evening there was a splendid illumination.”¹⁴⁶ Residents of the village of Springfield carefully organized their peace celebration for February 21st as an all-day event. In the morning they began with a display of the national flag, ringing of bells, and firing of cannon. Additional discharges of cannons took place at 1:00 P.M. In the evening came more bell ringing, firing of cannon, and the illumination of the houses. An unknown witness reported “the general satisfaction which was diffused on every countenance, and the continual echo of *PEACE! PEACE!* presented a scene the most novel and interesting of any ever witnessed in the village” In the evening many of the villagers sat down for a community dinner and toasted to “*PEACE* for our country!—May it prove *both* permanent and prosperous.”¹⁴⁷ Newark established a special

committee to organize the peace festivities. On February 15th the city "celebrated the coming of peace with great enthusiasm."¹⁴⁸ Cannons were fired at dawn and sunset and church bells rang for an hour in the morning and evening. All the town's churches held services at 11:00 A.M. The peace committee recommended special collections for the poor "knowing well that the joy of the hour would work to open purse strings." Candles illuminated Newark's houses and public buildings in the evening.¹⁴⁹ As the war ended the editor of the Republican Newark *Centinel* congratulated "our readers on the return of peace and prosperity to our beloved country." The editorial argued the war proved the superiority of the raw American militia at the Battle of New Orleans and the success of "American arms, by land and sea." Americans taught Great Britain a lesson, and "her maritime character must be greatly reduced in the eyes of the world."¹⁵⁰



Notes: The author gratefully acknowledges the financial support of the New Jersey Historical Commission for research related to New Jersey and War of 1812.

1-Thomas Barclay to Anthony Merry, April 26, 1806, in George Rives, (ed.), *Selections from the Correspondence of Thomas Barclay* (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1894), 230. Thomas Barclay was the British consul in New York City. Merry was the British ambassador to the United States in Washington.

2-Ibid, Thomas Barclay to Vice-Admiral Sir Andrew Mitchell, November 22, 1803, 154.

3-Ibid, Thomas Barclay to Anthony Merry, June 23, 1804, 166–168.

4-Ibid, Thomas Barclay to Anthony Merry, July 18, August 1, August 14, August 24, 1804, 178–190; Newark *Centinel of Freedom*, August 21, 1804.

5-New York *Morning Chronicle*, June 18–21, August 6, 9, 25, 29, 1804.

6-For a more detailed account of the *Leander* Affair and killing of Pierce see this author's article, "The *Leander* Affair," *The American Neptune*, XLIII:1 (January 1983), 40–50. For contemporary account see Trenton *Federalist*, May 5, 1806.

7-For accounts of the *Chesapeake* Affair see Edward Gaines, "The *Chesapeake* Affair: Virginians Mobilize to Defend National Honor," *Virginia Magazine of History and Biography*, 64 (April 1956, 131–42; Robert Cray, Jr., "Remembering the USS *Chesapeake*: The Politics of Maritime Death and Impressionment," *Journal of the Early Republic*, 25 (Fall 2005), 445–474.; Harvey Strum, "New York and the *Chesapeake* Affair, 1807," *The New England Journal of History*, 67:2 (Spring 2011), 34–53.

8-Trenton *True American*, July 6, 1807; Samuel Southard Journal, July 4, 1807, Box 115, Samuel Southard Papers, Special Collections and Rare Books, Firestone Library, Princeton University (PU), Princeton, New Jersey. Southard started out as Jeffersonian Republican and became Governor and Senator as a Whig. He also served for almost two decades in the House of Representatives.

9-Trenton *Federalist*, July 13, 1807. The newspaper reported that accounts were coming in of numerous meetings around the state.

10-David Pierson, *History of the Oranges*, (New York: Lewis Publishing Company, 1922), II, 235.

11-Trenton *Federalist*, July 6, 1807.

12-Trenton *True American*, July 6, 1807.

13-Newark *Centinel of Freedom*, July 14, 1807; Frank Urquhart, *A History of the City of Newark*, (New York: Lewis Publishing Company 1913), 2 vols, II: 597–98. .

14-New Jersey *Journal* (Elizabethtown), July 21, 1807.

15-Newark *Centinel of Freedom*, July 28, 1807.

16-Trenton *Federalist*, July 13, 1807.

17-Samuel Southard Journal, July 4, 1807, Box 115, Samuel Southard Papers, PU.

18-Brigade Orders, July 11, 1807 written on General Orders for the Militia of New Jersey, July 9, 1807, Book 56, Box 8, Military Records, Militia, Department of Defense, Division of Archives and Records Management, New Jersey Department of State, Trenton (hereafter cited as DARM)

19-Trenton *Federalist*, August 24, 1807.

20-Fourth Troop of Cavalry, Hunterdon Squadron, July 24, 1807, item 112, Petitions, Folder 52, Box 7, DARM.

21-First Uniform Company of Trenton, July 11, 1807, item 113, Petitions, folder 52, Box 7, DARM.

22-John Noble Cumming to Major General Elias Dayton, July 12, 1807, Miscellaneous Papers, John Noble Cumming, Manuscripts and Archives Division, New York Public Library (42nd Street), New York City.

- 23-Mary Hall to John Hall, her father, August 10, 1807, folder 1, Capner-Exton-Hill Papers, Special Collections, Alexander Library, Rutgers University, New Brunswick, New Jersey.
- 24-James Westcott, August 14, 1807, item 118, Petitions, folder 52, Box 7, DARM.
- 25-New York *Mercantile Advertiser*, September 7, 1807.
- 26-New York *Evening Post*, September 3–9, 1807; New York *Commercial Advertiser*, September 8, 1807; Boston *Columbian Centinel*, September 12, 1807.
- 27-For the political impact of the Embargo on New Jersey see: Harvey Strum, "New Jersey and the Embargo, 1807–1809," *New Jersey History*, 116:3–4 (Fall/Winter 1998), 16–47; Carl Prince, *New Jersey's Jeffersonian Republicans: The Genesis of an Early Party Machine, 1789–1817*, (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina, 1967); Rudolph and Margaret Pasler, *The New Jersey Federalists*, (Cranbury, New Jersey: Fairleigh Dickinson University Press, 1975); Walter Fee, *The Transition from Aristocracy to Democracy in New Jersey, 1789–1826*, (Somerville, N.J.: Somerset Press, 1933); Robert M. Rodgers, "Some Phases of New Jersey History in the Jeffersonian Period," (M.A. thesis, University of Chicago, 1931).
- 28-Thomas Barclay to The Commander of His Britannic Majesty's Ship of War off Sandy Hook, May 2, 1811, in Rives, *Thomas Barclay*, 294. Also see his letter to Rear-Admiral Sawyer, Halifax, May 20, 1811, 297. For the second quote on Chesapeake comparison, David Petriello, *Military History of New Jersey*, (Charleston: History Press, 2014), 101.
- 29-Resolution Adopted by the Legislature of New Jersey in January 1812, War of 1812 file, New Jersey State Archives, Trenton, New Jersey. Also, see *Votes and Proceedings of the Assembly of New Jersey* (Trenton: Legislature of New Jersey, 1812), 96–99.
- 30-New Brunswick *Guardian*, May 28, 1812.
- 31-Robert Downer, Jr., "Petition Against the War of 1812," War of 1812 file, Gloucester County Historical Society, Woodbury, New Jersey; Robert Dole and Edward Walton, Jr., *The Glassboro Story*, (York, PA: Maple Press, 1964), 138–139.
- 32-Trenton *Federalist*, July 6, 1812. In 1812 Federalists referred to their political opponents as Democrats which had a more radical connotation than their official name Republicans. Some historians use the term Democratic-Republicans. Current Democrats claim ancestry from the party of Jefferson, and the current Republican Party was founded in 1854 out of the anti-slavery movement and does not identify with Jefferson's party. For the politics of the War of 1812 in New Jersey see: Harvey Strum, "New Jersey Politics and the War of 1812," *New Jersey History*, 105:3–4 (Fall/Winter 1987), 37–70. Pasler and Pasler, *New Jersey Federalists*; Prince, *New Jersey's Jeffersonian Republicans*; Fee, *Transitions from Aristocracy to Democracy in New Jersey*; Rogers, "Some Phases of New Jersey History,"; Francis Lee, *New Jersey as a Colony and State*, 3, (New York: Publishing Society of New Jersey, 1902).
- 33-George Maxwell to Samuel Southard, December 11, 1812, Box 1, Samuel Southard Papers, PUL
- 34 *Annals of Congress*, 12th Cong., 1st sess., 1591.
- 35-Adam Body to Aaron Ogden, November 2, 1812, Aaron Ogden Papers, Special Collections, Alexander Library, Rutgers University, New Brunswick, N.J. (hereafter: RUL)
- 36-John Montgomery to Albert Gallatin, July 1, 1812, Albert Gallatin Papers, New York Historical Society, New York City (hereafter: N-YHS); Mark Lender, *One State in Arms: A Short Military History of New Jersey*, (Trenton: New Jersey Historical Commission, 1991), 38; Trenton *Federalist*, July 6, 1812. See the column "Friends of Peace."
- 37-Lucius Stockton, *An Address Delivered Before the Convention of Friends of Peace* (Trenton: Friends of Peace, 1814), 18–19. For attacks on anti-war Republicans, see for example, New Brunswick *Fredonian*, July 2, 1812; Prince, *New Jersey Republicans*, 171.
- 38-John Beatty to John Pintard, October 17, 1812, John Pintard to Fitch Hall, December 7, 1812, Box 7, John Pintard Papers, N-YHS.
- 39-For the Federalists, for example, Trenton *Federalist*, July to October 1812 and New Brunswick *Guardian*, July to October 1812; For the Republicans, Trenton *True American*, July to October 1812, New Brunswick *Fredonian*, July to October 1812, and Newark *Centinel of Freedom*, July to October 1812.
- 40-New Brunswick *Fredonian*, October 19, 1815.
- 41-Aaron Ogden, *A Proclamation*, (Trenton: N.P., December 1812), New Jersey Political Broadside, RUL. For the bitter debate over the anti-war resolutions, Mahlon Dickerson Diary, November 10, 1812, RUL.
- 42-Lewis Pintard to John Pintard, September 3, 1814, Box 12, Family Letters, Pintard Papers, N-YHS.
- 43-John Wall, "New Brunswick during the War of 1812," (New Brunswick, N.J.: New Brunswick Historical Club, 1901), 4.
- 44-See, for example: New Brunswick *Fredonian*, August 24, September 7, October 12, 19, 1815; Trenton *Federalist*, August 21, September 18, October 9, 1815; Bridgeton *Washington Whig*, kOctober 2, 9, 16, 1815; Trenton *True American*, September 11, October 9, 1815.
- 45-New Brunswick *Fredonian*, September 7, 1815; New Brunswick *Times*, August 17, 1815. See William Gribbin, *The Churches Militant: The War of 1812 in American Religion*, (New Haven; Yale University Press, 1973), 74–75; Fred Hood, *Reformed America: The Middle and Southern States, 1783–1837*, (University, Alabama: University of Alabama, 1980), 108–111. There were so few Catholics or Jews in New Jersey during the War of 1812 that both denominations were not relevant to the conflicts in the state during the war.
- 46-Trenton *True American*, September 9, 1803 cited in Rudolph Pasler, "The Federalist Party in Burlington County," (M.A. thesis, University of Delaware, 1964), 44.

- 47-Trenton *True American*, October 3, 1803, in Pasler, "Federalist Party in Burlington County," 44; Carl Prince, "The Leadership of New Jersey's First Party System," in *Proceedings of the Second Annual Symposium of the New Jersey Historical Commission* (Newark, 1971), 4. Quotation from Josiah Simpson to Samuel Southard, January 18, 1813, M-S folder, Box 1, Correspondence, 1807–1814, Samuel Southard Papers, Firestone Library, Princeton University (PUL).
- 48-William Gribbin, "American Episcopacy and the War of 1812," *Historical Magazine of the Protestant Episcopal Church*, 38 (March 1969), 38; Protestant Episcopal Church, *Journal of the Annual Proceedings of the Protestant Episcopal Church in New Jersey*, (Burlington, N.J.: Protestant Episcopal Church, 1812).
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- 51-New Brunswick *Fredonian*, October 23, 1813.
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- 55-John Stagg, *Mr. Madison's War*, (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1983), 172.
- 56-Amelia Mott Gummere, *Friends in Burlington*, (Philadelphia: Collins 1884), 72, 114; Woodbury *Constitution*, November 4, 1874; n.a. *To the Independent Electors of the County of Burlington* (n.p. 1817)
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- 61-Rochelle Guernsey, *New York City and Vicinity During the War of 1812*, 2 vols. (New York; Charles Woodward, 1889), I: 403.
- 62-Newark *Centinel*, December 21, 1813.
- 63-Trenton *True American*, June 21, 1813.
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- 65-Trenton *Federalist*, May 3, 1813. Also, see July 5, 1813.
- 66-Miles Smith to Sir William Strickland, May 23, 1814, Strickland Papers, New-York Historical Society (N-YHS).
- 67-Captain John Lambert to Governor Aaron Ogden, December 4, 1812, folder 7 (Hunterdon County), Box 16, Vol. 51, War of 1812, DARM.
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- 70-Captain William Cutler to Governor Aaron Ogden, November 30, 1812, folder 8, Box 16, Vol. 51, DARM.
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- 73-Ibid.
- 74-Arthur Pierce, *Iron in the Pines*, (New Brunswick, 1957), 90. Also, see Martha Furnace Day Book (Washington Township), 1810–1815. RUL.
- 75-John McPhee, *Pine Barrens*, (New York: Farrar, Straus, and Giroux, 1967), 33.
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- 79-John McPhee, *Pine Barrens*, 34.
- 80-Peter Kean, *An Oration . . . July 4, 1812*, 14.
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- 85-Captain William Garrison to Governor Aaron Ogden, November 30, 1812, folder 1, Box 16, Vol. 52, DARM

- 86-Captain William Potter to Governor Aaron Ogden, November 27, 1812, folder 4, Box 16, Vol. 51, DARM.
- 87-Trenton *True American*, June 8, 1812. For the more optimistic predictions of volunteers see May 4, 18, and 25, 1812.
- 88-New Brunswick *Guardian*, August 27, 1812. Also, June 14th for the need of the draft rather than reliance on volunteers.
- 89-New Brunswick *Guardian*, June 14, 1812.
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- 92-New Brunswick *Guardian*, December 31, 1812.
- 93-Thomas Fleming, *New Jersey: A Bicentennial History* (New York, 1977, 95; John Cunningham, *New Jersey: America's Main Road*, (Garden City, N.Y., 1966), 126.
- 94-Captain Robert L. Armstrong, et al, Camp at Billingsport, October 22, 1814, in Frank Stewart, ed., *Notes on Old Gloucester County, New Jersey* (Baltimore: Genealogical Publishing Company, 1977), Vol. III, 183.
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- 96-Horace Holden, "Reminiscences of the War of 1812," *New Jersey Historical Society Proceedings*, 2 (1917), 22.
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- 99-John Wall, "New Brunswick during the War of 1812," 5.
- 100- New Brunswick *Guardian*, July 8, 1813.
- 101-Trenton *True American*, September 6, 1813.
- 102-Robert Rodgers, "Some Phases." 114.
- 103-Trenton *Federalist*, August 23, 1814. Governor Pennington slightly exaggerated the number of volunteers, Governor Pennington to Jonathan Dayton, August 15, 1814, Case 4, Box 22, Gratz Collection, Historical Society of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. Also, Adjutant General Office, *Records of Officers*, 117-118, 135-136.
- 104-N.A., *History of Sandy Hook and Fort Hancock, N.J.* (n.p, n.d.), 13, New Jersey State Library, Trenton; Wilson, *Jersey Shore*, 1:334.
- 105-New Brunswick *Fredonian*, December 22, 1814.
- 106-Trenton *True American*, January 2, 1815.
- 107-Robert Rodgers, "Some Phases," 114.
- 108-New York *Mercantile Advertiser*, March 30, 1814; *New York Commercial Advertiser*, March 29, 1814; *New York Columbian*, March 25, 30, 1814.
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